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Abstract— An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a
decision on the part of the network members: They should
decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision
depends on the trade off between their perceived risk of being
infected and the cost of being protected. The network members
can make decisions repeatedly, based on information that they
receive about the changing infection level in the network.
We study the equilibrium states reached by a network whose
members increase (resp. decrease) their security deployment
when learning that the network infection is higher (resp.
lower). Our main result is that as the learning rate of the
members increases, the equilibrium level of infection increases.
We demonstrate this result both when members are strictly
rational and when they are not. We characterize the domains of
attraction of the equilibrium points. We validate our conclusions
with simulations on human mobility traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemiology research has made extensive use of disease
spreading models to study how a virus propagates in a
human population [7]. Shortly after the appearance of self-
replicating malicious programs in computers, aptly named
computer viruses, security researchers turned to epidemic
models to study the propagation of these programs [10].
More recently, the proliferation of capable mobile devices,
like smartphones, made mobile networks a fertile ground for
spreading malware [8]. The propagation characteristics of
malware in such networks have been studied and counter-
measures have been proposed [14], [3].
Countermeasures to an infection can be centrally enforced,
or the decision for their adoption can be left to individual
agents such as individual home computer users, companies,
or people in a society. Centralized enforcing is more likely
to work in tightly controlled environments, such as within
a company network where the users are obliged to abide
by the company security policy. However, when it is up
to individual agents to invest in protection against infection
[9], there appear contradicting incentives. Although agents
want to be safe against real or virtual viruses, they would
prefer to avoid investing in security: Security not only costs
money, but it usually also reduces the utility of the network
by, for example, isolating the agent from the rest of the
network, or it reduces the utility of the device by, for
example, slowing it down [16]. Another counterincentive
is that the security of a network agent exhibits positive
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externalities with respect to the decisions of others: If others
patch their computers, everyone becomes more secure, even
those who do not patch their own computer. If others are
vaccinated, everyone becomes safer, even those who are not
vaccinated. Therefore, agents have an incentive to free-ride
on the security investments of others, reaping the benefits
without paying the costs. More background on computer
network security and individual incentives can be found in
two recent books [1], [4].
In this paper, we model individuals’ changing responses
that depend myopically on the fluctuating infection level in
an ongoing epidemic. We combine the epidemic propagation
with a game theoretic description of the user behavior into
an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) model. We find
that the network reaches an endemic equilibrium, that is,
an equilibrium where the infection persists. We reach the
counterintuitive conclusion that the higher the learning rate
(the rate at which users learn what the infection level is), the
higher the infection level at the equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We first
describe our model for the evolution of the network state,
comprising an epidemic propagation component and a user
behavior component. We study the case of users with a
strictly rational behavior, then users with non-strictly rational
behavior. We end the paper with the empirical validation
of our conclusions through simulations on human mobility
traces. Due to space limitations we omit several of the proofs,
and the case of users with heterogeneous behavior.
II. MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC PROPAGATION AND USER
BEHAVIOR
A. Epidemic Propagation
There are N users in the network. Each user can be in
one of three states:
• Susceptible, denoted by S: The user is not currently
deploying security and is not infected.
• Infected, denoted by I: The user has been infected by
the virus, and will spread it to any susceptible user he
makes contact with.
• Protected, denoted by P : The user is deploying security
and is therefore immune to the virus.
The number and fraction of users in each state are denoted,
respectively, by NS , NI , NP and S, I, P . It follows that
NS + NI + NP = N and S + I + P = 1. The state of
the network is x = (S, I, P ), and the set of possible states
is X =
(
NS
N
, NI
N
, NP
N
)
⊆ 1
N
N
3
.
The evolution of the network state x is described as a
Continuous Time Markov Process, as follows. With each user
Event Effect ∆x
Meeting between S and I 1
N
(−1,+1, 0)
Update of S 1
N
(−pSP (x), 0,+pSP (x))
Update of P 1
N
(+pPS(x), 0,−pPS(x))
Disinfection of I 1
N
(0,−1,+1)
TABLE I: Possible events and their effect on the network
state
a Poisson alarm clock of rate β+ γ+ δ is associated. When
the clock of user i rings – say at time t – one of three events
happens:
M With probability β
β+γ+δ , user i has a meeting with
another user, chosen uniformly at random. If the meet-
ing is between a Susceptible and an Infected user, the
Susceptible user becomes Infected. Otherwise nothing
happens.
U With probability γ
β+γ+δ , user i receives an update about
the network state x, and he has the opportunity to revise
his current strategy if his state is S or P . If i’s state
is S, he switches to P with probability pSP (x). If i’s
state is P , he switches to S with probability pPS(x). If
i is Infected, nothing happens.
D With probability δ
β+γ+δ , user i has a disinfection oppor-
tunity. That is, if i is Infected, he becomes disinfected,
and we assume he becomes Protected. If i is not
Infected, nothing happens.
Table I summarizes the possible events and their effect on
the network state.
We consider the large population scenario, i.e., the limit
N −→∞. Kurtz [11] and Ljung [13] have shown that when
N −→ ∞, the Continuous Time Markov Process described
previously converges to a deterministic function, which is
the solution to a system of Ordinary Differential Equations:
d
dt
S = −βSI − γSpSP (x) + γPpPS(x) (1a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI (1b)
d
dt
P = δI + γSpSP (x)− γPpPS(x) (1c)
Eliminating P , as S + I + P = 1, the system becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI − γSpSP (x) + γ(1− S − I)pPS(x) (2a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI, (2b)
together with P = 1 − S − I . The state space is D =
(S, I), 0 ≤ S, I ≤ 1, S + I ≤ 1, and it is bounded. This
system is two dimensional and autonomous. Note that for
γ = 0, the model is identical to the standard SIR epidemic
model [7] (R stands for Recovered).
We will denote the righthand side of the system (2) by
F (x), and we will slightly abuse the notation for x to be
x = (S, I), x ∈ D. So, the system (2) will be written
d
dt
x = F (x). (3)
B. User Behavior
As can be seen from the epidemic propagation model,
the only point at which the users can make a choice is
at an update event. We assume that there is a cost cI
associated with becoming Infected, and a cost cP associated
with becoming Protected. It holds that cI > cP > 0. There
is no cost for being Susceptible. Note that these costs need
not be the actual costs; what influences the decisions of users
are the costs as perceived by the users.
If we assume that each user behaves strictly rationally, the
choice between Susceptible and Protected depends on which
state minimizes the user’s expected cost. Specifically, given
the aforementioned model of random pair meetings, a user’s
expected cost at a particular network state x = (S, I) is cP
if he chooses to be Protected and IcI if he chooses to be
Susceptible risking infection. Therefore, the user’s decision
would be S if IcI < cP , and P if IcI > cP . In this case,
the functions pSP (x) and pPS(x) would be step functions
of I:
pSP (x) = pSP (I) = 1{IcI > cP } (4)
pPS(x) = pPS(I) = 1{IcI < cP }. (5)
If IcI = cP , then both choices are optimal, and any
randomization between them is also optimal. So, when IcI =
cP , the functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) are multivalued. For
convenience, we define
I∗ ≡
cP
cI
. (6)
Note that if we were to set I∗ to a value larger than 1, then
pSP would always be equal to 0, and pPS would always be
equal to 1. In that case, our model would be identical to the
SIRS model [7].
To account for users that cannot be assumed to be strictly
rational, or their perception of the cost is not crisp (e.g., they
are not sure about the exact values of cI and cP ), or they
take the network state report to be not completely accurate,
we consider a different scenario for the functions pSP (·) and
pPS(·). We assume that they can be arbitrary functions of I ,
as long as the former is non-decreasing with I and the latter
is non-increasing with I .
In what follows, first we will consider the case that pSP (·)
and pPS(·) are discontinuous step functions and actually
multivalued at the discontinuity, and then that they are
continuously differentiable.
III. THE USERS ARE STRICTLY RATIONAL
The best response correspondence dictates the shape of
pSP (I) and pPS(I):
pSP (I) =


0, I < I∗
[0, 1], I = I∗
1, I > I∗
pPS(I) =


1, I < I∗
[0, 1], I = I∗
0, I > I∗
.
(7)
As F (x) (recall (3)) is set-valued, we have to solve the
differential inclusion
d
dt
x ∈ F (x), x ∈ D. (8)
The system can also be viewed as a switched non-linear
system [12], or as a positive and compartmental system [2],
[6] because it is characterized by nonnegative solutions for
nonnegative initial conditions. Notice, however, that, unlike
such systems, our system only has point equilibria rather
than a continuum of equilibria.
We define a partition of the state space D into three
domains: D− = D ∩ {(S, I), I < I∗}, D+ = D ∩
{(S, I), I > I∗}, and L = D ∩ {(S, I) : I = I∗}. The
domain L will also be referred to as the discontinuity line.
A. Existence of solutions
A solution for this differential inclusion [5] is an abso-
lutely continuous vector function x(t) defined on an interval
J for which d
dt
x(t) ∈ F (x(t)) almost everywhere on J .
From the theory of differential inclusions we know that a
solution of (8) exists if, for every x ∈ D, the basic conditions
apply: The set F (x) is nonempty, bounded, closed, convex,
and the function F is upper semicontinuous.
The basic conditions apply in our case and therefore a
solution exists.
B. Uniqueness of solutions
In general, because the righthand side of (8) is multivalued,
even though two solutions at time t0 are both at the point
x0, they may not coincide on an interval t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 for any
t1 > t0. If any two solutions that coincide at t0 also coincide
until some t1 > t0, then we say that right uniqueness holds
at (t0, x0). Left uniqueness at (t0, x0) is defined similarly
(with t1 < t0), and (right or left) uniqueness in a domain
holds, if it holds at each point of the domain.
The solution is unique in D− and in D+ because F has
continuous partial derivatives there.
We next show which of the solutions of (8) lying on
the line of discontinuity L can be uniquely continued in
the direction of increasing t. We see that all solutions can
be uniquely continued, except those that start at the point
(S, I) =
(
δ
β
, I∗
)
. Those latter solutions all start at the same
point and then diverge, but none of them can ever approach
that point again in the positive direction of time. So, if we
ignore the initial point of those solutions, all solutions can
be uniquely continued.
C. Stationary points
The stationary points are found by solving for x the
inclusion 0 ∈ F (x).
1) Stationary points above the discontinuity line: There
can be no stationary points in the domain D+. The system
becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI − γS (9a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI. (9b)
From the first equation, we see that S has to be zero. But
then the second equation implies that I also has to be zero,
which is not an admissible value for I as I = 0 cannot be
above the discontinuity line.
2) Stationary points below the discontinuity line: We look
for stationary points in the domain D−. The system becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI + γ(1− S − I) (10a)
d
dt
I = βSI − δI, (10b)
which is identical to the SIRS case except that the domain
is not the whole state space, it is only D−.
This system has the solutions:
X0 = (S0, I0) = (1, 0) (11)
X1 = (S1, I1) =
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
)
. (12)
The second solution, X1, is admissible if and only if X1 ∈
D−, i.e.,
δ
β
≤ 1, (13)
and also
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
< I∗. (14)
Note that if δ
β
= 1, then X0 and X1 coincide. Also, it
is not surprising that X1 is the equilibrium point of the
corresponding SIRS model. That is, I∗ does not play an
explicit role in this case, as long as (14) holds.
3) Stationary points on the discontinuity line: We look
for stationary points on the discontinuity line I = I∗, that
is, we solve the inclusion 0 ∈ F (S, I∗) for S. The system
becomes
d
dt
S = −βSI∗ + [−γS, γ(1− S − I∗)] (15a)
d
dt
I = βSI∗ − δI∗. (15b)
Since I∗ > 0, d
dt
I is zero only when S = δ
β
. We then have
to check if it is possible to make d
dt
S equal to zero, that is,
if 0 ∈ F ( δ
β
, I∗). We find that it is possible when I∗ is such
that
I∗ ≤
1− δ
β
1 + δ
γ
. (16)
In that case, the stationary point is
X2 = (S2, I2) =
(
δ
β
, I∗
)
. (17)
In general, there are many combinations of pSP (I∗) and
pPS(I
∗) that make d
dt
S equal to zero, but there is always
one with pSP (I∗) = 0. In that case, pPS(I∗) = δI
∗
γ(1− δ
β
−I∗)
.
To summarize, X0 exists always. If δ < β, one more
equilibrium point exists: X1 if I∗ >
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
, or X2 otherwise.
D. Local Asymptotic Stability
1) Stability of X0 and X1: We show that, when δβ ≥ 1,
X0 is asymptotically stable. When δβ < 1, X0 is a saddle
point, and if X1 exists it is asymptotically stable. These
results follow by the evaluation of the Jacobian at the points
X0 and X1, and by checking the sign of its eigenvalues.
2) Stability of X2: To show that the stationary point on
the discontinuity line is asymptotically stable we will use
Theorem 1 below [5, §19, Theorem 3]. To use this theorem
we transform the system so that the line of discontinuity
is the horizontal axis, the stationary point is (0, 0), and the
trajectories have a clockwise direction for increasing t.
We set x = δ
β
− S and y = I − I∗. The domains
D,D−, D+ become G = {(x, y)|x ≤ δ
β
, y ≥ −I∗, y − x ≤
1 − I∗ − δ
β
}, G− = G ∩ {(x, y)|y < 0}, and G+ =
G ∩ {(x, y)|y > 0}. Then, the system can be written as
dx
dt
= P−(x, y) (18a)
dy
dt
= Q−(x, y) = −βx(y + I∗) (18b)
for (x, y) ∈ G−, and
dx
dt
= P+(x, y) (19a)
dy
dt
= Q+(x, y) = −βx(y + I∗) (19b)
for (x, y) ∈ G+.
The partial derivatives of P±, that is, of P+ and of P−,
are denoted by P±x , P±xx, P±y etc., and similarly for Q±. We
define two quantities A± in terms of the functions P±, Q±
and their derivatives at the point (0, 0):
A± =
2
3
(
P±x +Q
±
y
P±
−
Q±xx
2Q±x
)
. (20)
Theorem 1: Let the conditions
Q− = Q+ = 0, P− < 0, P+ > 0 (21)
Q−x < 0, Q
+
x < 0 (22)
be fulfilled at the point (0, 0). Then, A+ −A− < 0 implies
that the zero solution is asymptotically stable, whereas A+−
A− > 0 implies that the zero solution is unstable.
All the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied in our case,
together with A+ − A− < 0. The condition P− < 0 is
equivalent to (16), i.e., the condition on I∗ that causes the
stationary point to be on the line of discontinuity. All the
other conditions are straightforward to verify.
Therefore, the stationary point (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) is asymp-
totically stable.
E. Domains of attraction
From Theorem 6, §13 [5] we know that for autonomous
systems on the plane, it holds that if a half trajectory T+
is bounded, then its ω-limit set Ω(T+) contains either a
stationary point or a closed trajectory. Recall that the ω-limit
set of a half trajectory T+(x = φ(t), t0 ≤ t <∞) is the set
of all points q for which there exists a sequence t1, t2, . . .
tending to ∞ such that φ(ti) −→ q as i −→∞.
In this section, we show that there are no solutions that
are closed trajectories. So we can conclude that all system
trajectories converge to equilibrium points. When there is
more than one equilibrium point, we show which trajectories
converge to which point.
The main result is that for any half trajectory T+, its ω-
limit set Ω(T ) can only contain equilibrium points, that is,
X0 = (1, 0), X1 = (S1, I1) =
(
δ
β
,
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
)
, or X2 = (
δ
β
, I∗).
We will find the following two functions useful:
E(S, I) = S − S1 ln(S) + I +
γ
β
ln(I), (23)
M(S, I) = S − (S1 +
γ
β
) ln(S +
γ
β
) + I − I1 ln(I), (24)
It holds that E(S, I) is constant on trajectories in the area
D+, and M(S, I) is decreasing along trajectories in the area
D−.
Assume that there exists a half trajectory T+ whose limit
set Ω(T ) contains a closed trajectory Γ. By successively
eliminating properties of such a trajectory, we will prove
that it cannot exist. Note that Lemma 1 below is trivial if
( δ
β
, I∗) is an equilibrium point.
Lemma 1: The point ( δ
β
, I∗) cannot be on Γ.
If (S, I) = ( δ
β
, I∗) is not on Γ, then on Γ there holds right
uniqueness. Also, Ω(Γ) = Γ. We will continue by proving
that Γ cannot have more or fewer than two intersection points
with L.
Lemma 2: A closed trajectory Γ that does not pass
through the point ( δ
β
, I∗) can have neither more than two
nor fewer than two intersection points with the discontinuity
line L. If it has two intersection points, they cannot be on
the same side of ( δ
β
, I∗).
Lemma 3: A closed trajectory Γ cannot intersect the dis-
continuity line L on exactly two points that are on opposite
sides of the point ( δ
β
, I∗).
From the previous lemmata, we conclude that there can
be no closed trajectory Γ. Therefore, all trajectories have to
converge to equilibrium points.
F. Conclusion
The total fraction I = 1−
δ
β
1+ δ
γ
of Infected at the system
equilibrium increases with the update rate γ, until I becomes
equal to the threshold I∗. The reason for this increase is that,
when the equilibrium value of I is below I∗, the trajectories
will eventually be completely contained in the domain D−
(below I∗). In this domain, every time a Protected is being
informed about the value of I will choose to become Suscep-
tible, thus fueling the infection. In parallel, no Susceptible
will choose to become Protected. The larger the value of
γ, the shorter time a user will spend being Protected, thus
the smaller the fraction of Protected. However, a smaller
fraction of Protected implies a larger fraction of Infected,
as the fraction of Susceptible at equilibrium is necessarily
δ
β
, i.e., it is independent of γ.
When the quantity 1−
δ
β
1+ δ
γ
exceeds I∗, the equilibrium value
of I is limited to I∗; further increases of γ have no effect.
The explanation is that, as soon as the instantaneous value
of I exceeds I∗, Susceptible users switch to Protected, and
Protected users stay Protected, thus bringing the infection
level below I∗. However, there is no equilibrium point
for the system in the domain D−, so the only possible
equilibrium value of I is I∗. For I = I∗ there are in general
many combinations of pSP (I∗) and pPS(I∗) that lead to an
equilibrium, including one with pSP (I∗) = 0 and pPS(I∗) >
0. That combination means that no Susceptible users become
Protected, but some Protected become Susceptible.
IV. THE USERS ARE NOT STRICTLY RATIONAL
For the case of non-strictly-rational users, the behavior
functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) are continuously differentiable,
and we require that d
dI
pSP (I) > 0 and ddI pSP (I) < 0. Other
than that, the two functions are arbitrary.
A. Stationary points
The equilibrium points of the system are found by solving
for x the equation F (x) = 0:
d
dt
S = 0 = −βSI − γSpSP (I) + γ(1− S − I)pPS(I)
(25a)
d
dt
I = 0 = βSI − δI (25b)
From (25b) we see that either I = 0 or S = δ
β
.
• Equilibrium point X0
Substituting I = 0 into (25a), we have that X0 =
(S0, I0) =
(
pPS(0)
pSP (0)+pPS(0)
, 0
)
. These values of (S0, I0)
are always admissible since they are always non-
negative and at most equal to 1.
Recalling the meaning of pPS(0) and pSP (0), we can
reasonably expect that pPS(0) = 1 and pSP (0) = 0:
Protected have no reason to remain Protected, and
Susceptible have no reason to become Protected, when
there is no infection in the network. In this case, X0 is
the point (1, 0).
• Equilibrium point X1
Substituting S = δ
β
into (25a), we see that I has to
satisfy
g(I) ≡ −δI−
γδ
β
pSP (I)+γ
(
1−
δ
β
− I
)
pPS(I) = 0.
(26)
To solve g(I) = 0 for I we need to know the two re-
sponse functions pSP (I) and pPS(I). But even without
knowing them, we can still prove that g(I) = 0 has a
unique solution for I ∈ [0, 1] under the condition that
δ
β
≤
pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
. (27)
We first show that g(I) is monotonically decreasing in
the interval [0, 1], and then we show that, under the
condition (27), g(0)g(1) ≤ 0. We can then conclude
that there is exactly one solution of g(I) = 0 in the
interval [0, 1].
Denoting by I1 the solution of g(I) = 0, we can now
conclude that X1 = (S1, I1) = ( δβ , I1) is uniquely
determined under (27). The values S1, I1 are admissible
since they are both between 0 and 1. Note that if (27)
does not hold then both g(0) < 0 and g(1) < 0, so
the monotonicity of g in [0, 1] implies that X1 does
not exist. So, (27) is really a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of X1.
B. Local Asymptotic Stability
To examine the (local) stability of the equilibrium points
X0 and X1 we compute the Jacobian of the system (25) and
evaluate it at these two points. Local stability at a point is
equivalent to the negativity of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at that point. So, X0 is stable when X1 does
not exist, and unstable otherwise. X1 is always stable.
C. Domains of Attraction
Since the system is two dimensional and F is continuously
differentiable, we can use Dulac’s criterion to show that the
system can have no periodic trajectory.
Theorem 2 (Dulac’s criterion): If there exists a continu-
ously differentiable function h : R2 −→ R such that ∇ ·
(hF ) is continuous and non-zero on some simply connected
domain A, then no periodic trajectory can lie entirely in A.
In our case, the domain A is the state space excluding the
line I = 0. Note that there can be no periodic trajectory that
passes from a point with I = 0. We select as function h the
function h(S, I) = 1
I
. We compute ∇ · (hF ) to be
∇ · (hF ) = −β − γ
pSP (I)
I
− γ
pPS(I)
I
< 0, ∀(S, I) ∈ A,
(28)
which is continuous and non-zero in A. Then, from Dulac’s
criterion, no periodic trajectory lies entirely in A, and,
consequently, the system has no periodic trajectory at all.
From the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, the system can only
converge to a periodic trajectory or an equilibrium point; so,
we can conclude that every trajectory must converge to an
equilibrium point, that is, either to X0 or X1.
D. Conclusion
The equilibrium point X0 is independent of γ. We show
now that, at X1 =
(
δ
β
, I1
)
, the equilibrium level of the
Infected increases with γ. To this end, we take the derivative
dI1
dγ
and we see that is always positive.
V. SIMULATIONS ON MOBILITY TRACES
We validate our conclusions using simulations on human
mobility traces. The traces that we use are Bluetooth contacts
among 41 devices given to participants in a conference [15].
The traces were collected over a period of approximately 72
hours.
The contact rate β is determined by the traces. Actually, β
is a function of time β(t), since the number of contacts per
time unit fluctuates depending on the time of day. We want
to establish whether the fraction of Infected indeed increases
for larger values of the update rate γ. For the simulations
that follow, we set δ = (6hr)−1, and we plot the system
trajectories on the S−I plane (average of 30 simulations) for
three different values of γ, (1hr)−1, (6hr)−1, and (24hr)−1.
The initial conditions for all simulations were 1 Infected and
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Fig. 1: The trajectory of the system (average of 30 simulations) on the SI plane, when δ = (6hr)−1 and γ takes the values
(1hr)−1, (6hr)−1, and (24hr)−1. The thresholds are I∗ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. We see that the network experiences higher numbers
of Infected devices for higher values of γ, and for I∗ = 0.1, 0.5 we also observe the limiting effect of I∗.
40 Susceptible. Each simulation runs until either there are no
Infected, or the end of the traces is reached.
We use a piecewise continuous response function
pSP (I) =


0 I < I∗ − ǫ2
1
ǫ
(I − I∗ + ǫ2 ) I
∗ − ǫ2 < I < I
∗ + ǫ2
1 I > I∗ + ǫ2
(29)
and pPS(I) = 1− pSP (I).
In Figure 1 we plot simulation results for I∗ =
0.1, 0.5, 0.9, and ǫ = 0.001, omitting an initial transient
phase. Since β(t) is not constant, the system state oscillates
among two equilibrium points, X0 (when β(t) is low enough
that δ > β(t)) and either X1 or X2, depending on whether
(14) is satisfied or not
(
1− δ
β
1+ δ
γ
< I∗
)
. Despite these period-
icities, we see that for increasing values of γ the system
trajectories go through higher values of I , thus confirming
our main conclusion that the infection level increases with
the update rate. The effect of lowering I∗ is that it limits the
maximum infection at the equilibrium, so the trajectories are
capped at values of I not far above I∗. For lower values of
I∗, we see that the effect of γ on the Infected is smaller.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We study the effect of network users being cost-sensitive
when deploying security measures. In particular, if users
increasingly deploy security when learning that the level of
network infection is higher, and retract the deployment when
the level of infection drops, then a higher learning rate leads
to a higher equilibrium level of infected users.
We reach this same conclusion in two scenarios. Our main
scenario is when users are strictly rational cost minimizers,
having a discontinuous multi-valued best response behavior.
The conclusion does not change when the response function
is an arbitrary continuous single-valued function, as long as
the function implies that users increasingly choose protection
as the level of infection rises. We validate the conclusions
both theoretically, using a system of differential inclusions or
differential equations, and also with simulations on human
mobility traces.
We use the theory of differential inclusions to prove
properties (existence, uniqueness, stability) of the system
trajectories in the case of multivalued response functions.
In the case of uniform user behavior, either continuous or
discontinuous, the system is two-dimensional, and we are
able to exclude the existence of periodic trajectories and to
characterize the domains of attraction for each equilibrium
point.
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